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Abstract
Background: Within psychiatric practice and policy there is 
considerable controversy surrounding the nature and as-
sessment of impairments of decision-making capacity (DMC) 
for treatment in persons diagnosed with affective disorders. 
We identify the problems of “cognitive bias” and “outcome 
bias” in assessment of DMC for treatment in affective disor-
der and aim to help resolve these problems with an analysis 
of how time is experienced in depression and mania. Sam-
pling and Methods: We conducted purposeful sampling and 
a qualitative phenomenological analysis of interview data 
on patients with depression and mania, exploring temporal 
experience and decision-making regarding treatment. Re-
sults: In both severe depression and mania there is a distinc-
tive experience of the future. Two consequences can follow: 
a loss of evaluative differentiation concerning future out-
comes and, relatedly, inductive failure. This temporal inabil-
ity can compromise an individual’s ability to appreciate or 
“use or weigh” treatment information. Conclusions: The 
decision-making abilities required for self-determination in-
volve an ability to evaluate alternative future outcomes. Our 
results show that, within severe depression or mania, antici-
pation of future outcomes is inflexibly fixed at one end of the 
value spectrum. We therefore propose a temporal model of 
decision-making abilities, which could be used to improve 
assessment of DMC in affective disorder.
© 2018 The Author(s) 
Published by S. Karger AG, Basel
Introduction
Within psychiatric practice and policy, considerable 
debate surrounds the assessment of impaired decision-
making capacity (DMC) in affective disorders. We argue 
that within the context of affective disorder, a temporal 
understanding of decision-making ability, which focuses 
on an individual’s evaluation of potential future out-
comes, could assist in assessment of DMC for treatment 
by showing two specific patterns of distortion in the de-
cision-making process that function as tipping points for 
decision-making ability/inability.
We start by reviewing the key issues in the DMC de-
bate regarding affective disorder before moving on to 
show how an analysis of temporal experience can help 
resolve these issues.
This article is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (CC BY) (http://www.karger.com/Services/
OpenAccessLicense). Usage, derivative works and distribution are 
permitted provided that proper credit is given to the author and the 
original publisher.
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“Cognitive Bias” and “Outcome Bias”
The concept of DMC puts the emphasis on assessing the 
decision-making process rather than the decision-making 
outcome. The English Mental Capacity Act, for example, as 
one of its principles states that “a person is not to be treat-
ed as unable to make a decision merely because he makes 
an unwise decision” [1]. In applying this standard, the 
analysis of decision-making abilities is what matters. How-
ever, most legal formulations of these abilities have attract-
ed criticism that they overemphasise cognitive abilities and 
do not adequately detail the non-cognitive, or evaluative, 
abilities, which can be required to make decisions about 
treatment. This can be called the problem of “cognitive 
bias,” which threatens to compromise the legal standard of 
DMC. The tendency to treat someone as unable to make a 
decision because they make an unwise decision can be 
called the problem of “outcome bias,” which also threatens 
to compromise assessments of DMC under the legal stan-
dard.
The medical ethicist Louis Charland has called the cog-
nitive bias problem “a legal noose around the theoretical 
neck of capacity” [2] and clinicians have complained that 
legal definitions of decision-making abilities may well be 
irrelevant to the subtle evaluative impairments of decision-
making associated with affective disorders that can impact 
upon the “rationality” of decisions made by patients [3–6].
Attempts to resolve the cognitive bias problem have fo-
cused on the concept of “appreciation,” sometimes mean-
ing “the ability to apply information, abstractly under-
stood, to oneself” but also encapsulating a notion of “irra-
tional” belief. Kim, following Grisso and Appelbaum, has 
argued that a refusal of treatment shows a lack of appre-
ciation ability if the belief underpinning the refusal is “sub-
stantially irrational, unrealistic, or a considerable distor-
tion of reality” and due to a “cognitive or psychiatric con-
dition” [7, 8].
This appreciation ability is helpful for assessing DMC 
for treatment in cases of psychosis where delusions may be 
impacting upon decision-making [9], although even in this 
context, potential problems surround the judgement that 
irrational beliefs, arising from a mental disorder, are un-
derpinning refusal. In the case of affective disorders, how-
ever, where delusions may not be present, or overt, or 
where consent may be as controversial as refusal (e.g., elec-
troconvulsive therapy), this operationalisation of appreci-
ation is far more problematic and returns us to the problem 
of “outcome bias.” For even if appreciation helps us with 
the “cognitive bias” problem, how might it help avoid the 
difficulties of outcome-based assessments? How, without 
resorting to judgements as to what constitutes a “seriously 
irrational” decision outcome, would the appreciation abil-
ity capture how “hopeless-helpless” thinking impacts on 
the treatment decision-making process in depression? 
Similarly, how would it show why behavioural changes in 
the early phases of mania do not simply represent a capac-
itous re-evaluation of future plans?
In England and Wales, the Mental Capacity Act [1] 
(S3(1)(c)) includes an inability to “use or weigh” relevant 
information in the process of deciding, rather than an in-
ability to “appreciate,” and one of its aims was to avoid ref-
erence to a “rationality” requirement [10]. It also includes 
the requirement that relevant information include “rea-
sonably foreseeable consequences of – (a) deciding one way 
or another, or (b) failing to make the decision” (Mental 
Capacity Act 2005; S3(4); emphasis added).
If we are to arrive at an interpretation of “appreciation” 
or “use or weigh” that is fit for purpose in affective disor-
der, we need research that does not prejudge the interpre-
tation using extant forms of measurement [11, 12] and 
which gives a more detailed and empirically grounded un-
derstanding of how such abilities might be compromised.
A potential way forward is to analyse temporal experi-
ence within affective disorders and how temporal abilities 
within the decision-making process can be distorted by de-
pression and mania.
Temporal Experience
Temporal experience is a classic theme in psychopa-
thology – for example, in Jaspers’ General Psychopathology 
[13] or work by Lewis [14]. In affective disorder, key symp-
toms and signs revolve around temporality and speed (e.g., 
slowed/speeding thoughts; hyperactivity, psychomotor 
retardation), and classic phenomenological psychiatrists 
such as Minkowski and Binswanger had regarded manic 
depressive insanity (the old Kraepelinian category for what 
we now call “severe unipolar depression” and “bipolar af-
fective disorder”) as essentially a disorder of temporality 
[15, 16]. Contemporary psychopathologists and philoso-
phers of psychiatry continue to express significant interest 
in the theme [17–21]. This is a rich literature, but clarity 
and consistency remain problematic [22, 23], and, to our 
knowledge, the study of temporal experience has not, be-
fore our work, been extended to problems in DMC.
Using in-depth analysis of interview data, we aim to 
show the centrality of temporality to DMC in affective dis-
order and to use this to propose an understanding of how 
the ability to appreciate or use and weigh treatment can be 
impaired in affective disorder. Our aim was to integrate the 
empirical and conceptual into a clinical and legal context 
[24].
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Methods
We investigated the temporal structure of treatment decision-
making using open structured in-depth interviews with patients 
with depression and mania. We used a method drawing upon in-
terpretative phenomenological analysis [25] adapted to interviews 
in clinical research settings. An interview topic guide was devel-
oped, and the interviews guided the participants to consider their 
past, present and future in relation to real-time treatment deci-
sions with room left to clarify the meaning of participants’ spon-
taneous comments. The analysis started with close reading of the 
transcribed texts and, through a process of textual coding, moved 
toward thematisation. The phenomenological method and analy-
sis is described and illustrated in more detail elsewhere [22, 23, 26]. 
Interpretative phenomenological analysis aims to purposefully 
collect homogeneous samples to address a question about subjec-
tivity or experiential structure. To enquire into the experiential 
structure of other people there need to be rich, in-depth data with 
a multi-perspective analysis. For these reasons, sample sizes must 
not be too large.
Interpretative phenomenological methods are indicated for 
two reasons. Firstly, research on the nature of DMC in affective 
disorders is a context in which discovery and hypothesis genera-
tion is needed – as discussed above, we cannot presuppose we have 
valid measurements of the relevant decision-making abilities. Sec-
ondly, case-based interviews are the main form of evidence in 
DMC assessment, where clinicians and courts need to reach deci-
sions, based on an analysis of single-case evidence. An interpreta-
tive framework for collecting and presenting evidence on single 
cases is therefore relevant to DMC assessment.
Sampling was purposeful, with all cases belonging to the cate-
gory of “affective disorder.” The cases were carefully selected so 
there was no significant comorbidity. All the depression cases had 
previously experienced depressive episodes, with no history of 
mania/hypomania. All mania cases had established histories of 
bipolar affective disorder with several prior affective episodes. 
The case selection, clinical ratings and interviews were conducted 
by G.S.O., a senior psychiatrist.
The interviews typically lasted 1–2 h and involved a follow-up 
interview within a few days. After transcription, coding and analy-
sis were conducted within an interdisciplinary research group 
comprising psychiatric, legal, phenomenological and service user 
expertise. This was done to provide different perspectives of rele-
vance to the material and to withdraw it from an exclusively “clin-
ical” frame. The illustrative excerpts included below are drawn 
from a much larger body of interview data.
Results
Sample Characteristics
Depression
Twelve participants satisfied the DSM-5 criteria for 
major depressive disorder. These were split into what we 
will call “severe depression” (D1–6) and “non-severe” de-
pression (N1–6). D1–6 were sampled from acute psychi-
atric care settings in the South London and Maudsley 
NHS Foundation Trust. All 6 cases had recurrent epi-
sodes, the current episode being severe with melancholic 
features. Their Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression 
scores were in the range of 32–46, with 3 cases showing 
psychotic features. All patients faced treatment decisions, 
and all but 1 were inpatients. Their ages ranged from 57 
to 77 years; 3 patients were male and 3 were female.
N1–6 were sampled from non-acute psychological 
outpatient treatment settings in the South London and 
Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust and had histories of 
primary care in South East London. All 6 cases had recur-
rent episodes, the current episode being mild to moderate 
with anxious distress. Their Beck Depression Inventory 
II scores were in the range of 17–36. All patients faced 
decisions about whether to start cognitive behavioural 
therapy. Their ages ranged from 22 to 74 years; 3 patients 
were male and 3 were female.
Mania
Six participants satisfied the DSM-5 criteria for bipolar 
I disorder, the current episode being manic (BP1–6). 
They were all inpatients in the South London and Mauds-
ley NHS Foundation Trust. All manic episodes were se-
vere according to the DSM-5 criteria. The patients’ Young 
Mania Rating Scale scores ranged from 23 to 48, with 4 
patients showing psychotic features. All patients faced 
treatment decisions. Their ages ranged from 32 to 57 
years; 2 patients were female and 4 were male.
Phenomenological Analysis of Decision-Making  
in Affective Disorder
Selected interview excerpts for severe depression, non-
severe depression and mania are shown in Table 1.
Severe and Non-Severe Depression
What is it like to make decisions about treatment when 
depressed? Our interviews present rich data suggesting 
the relevance of temporality. While lack of hope for im-
provement, combined with wishing for such hope, was 
common in both severe and non-severe cases, the severe 
depression cases revealed a distinct and dominant tem-
poral pattern – a future of negative evaluative inflexibility 
and stifling negation or nothingness. While those with 
severe depression appeared able to envisage a future, it 
appeared rigidly closed to positive possibilities (see ex-
cerpts 1 and 2).
Related to this future experience of negation or noth-
ingness was the experience of death, well expressed by D4 
in excerpt 3. What D4 is expressing is not a thought about 
wanting/not wanting to die, but a more fundamental ex-
perience of death coming toward him. Here and else-
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Table 1. Selected interview excerpts for severe depression, non-severe depression and mania
Excerpt 
No.
Mental state
Severe depression
1 Interviewer: What does tomorrow look like for you? What does tomorrow feel like?
D2: Oh I don’t know. I have to get through tonight.
Interviewer: Yeah.
D2: Just lying there.
Interviewer: Does it feel like an eternity?
D2: Mmm.
Interviewer: An eternity of what?
D2: Dark.
2 Interviewer: What about tomorrow?
D5: I don’t know. Same as today – nothing.
3 Interviewer: How would you describe your feelings now?
D4: I’m anxious again. You know…everything’s a distraction,…to take me away from what’s going to happen. 
You know I go back to my room and lie there ready, that’s why I lie in my room.
Interviewer: Ready for what?
D4: Ready for death.
4 Interviewer: Does it help to know what the time is?
D2: It’s worse.
Interviewer: It’s worse?
D2: Mmm.
Interviewer: Why is it worse to know what time it is?
D2: I know how long I gotta go…till what? Till what? This is terrible.
5 Interviewer: So, you’re in hospital at the moment and there’s the decision about whether to stay here or not stay here. 
There’s this decision about whether to stay in hospital.
D4: Yeah.
Interviewer: How do you see yourself in time to come, like in the next few weeks or months? What do you hope for?
D4: Don’t know.
Interviewer: You don’t know?
D4: I don’t know whether I’ve got a few weeks.
6 Interviewer: I also spoke to…your Care Co-ordinator. And she was telling me a little bit about how things have been for 
you in the past…two years ago now, after the treatment that you had in hospital you were very good. You 
felt well. She said that you were very…
D5: I was well once…. I was well, I don’t know what year it was, but I was well…. But now…I’m no good again 
now….
Interviewer: Do you hope to get better?
D5: There’s no chance of that.
Interviewer: No chance? How do you know?
D5: Because I know.
Interviewer: Sorry? How do you know there’s no chance? You got better before.
D5: That was a long time ago.
Interviewer: Couldn’t you get better again?
D5: No.
Interviewer: How do you know that?
[no reply]
Interviewer: Possible?
D5: No.
Interviewer: Not possible to get better?
[non-verbal negation]
Interviewer: How come you got better before then?
D5: I dunno. Maybe it’s the treatment I had.
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Table 1 (continued)
Excerpt 
No.
Mental state
Interviewer: Could the treatment make you better again?
D5: It did then. It must have done.
Interviewer: Could it do it again?
D5: No.
Interviewer: Are you sure about that?
D5: Yes. Yes.
Non-severe depression
7 Interviewer: So this [opting for CBT] is, in a sense, about wanting the future to be different, or wanting some sort of 
change?
N1: Mmmm, wanting the future to be different? Wanting more say in it, I suppose. Wanting more control over 
it and not feeling like I’m just coasting and just being pulled in a direction that I’m not necessarily happy 
with. I suppose it is about having a bit more control over my mind, and therefore my day to day existence.
8 Interviewer: How does the future seem for you?
N2: Bleak.
9 N5: The pain is going to continue, the pain of being depressed and the pain of everything I feel. And it feels like 
you’re consumed with negative thoughts over and over again.
10 N5: And in the future, from all the treatments or self-help that I am doing I would like to achieve just genuine 
happiness where the majority of my days I’m happy, and if I am upset about something I can confront it 
properly and deal with it in an appropriate and mature manner.
Mania
11 BP7: It’s bright, it’s very bright. It’s as bright as the sun is. … The light is part of me. … I’m part of the circle of 
life; I’m part of the energy of life.
12 BP6: Charlie and the Chocolate Factory. You know when the elevator smashed through the roof? … Reach the 
peak and it’s…through the roof, through the ceiling. … Not nasty. It’s like it’s being free. He looked down 
and he could see everything, and everything was his.
13 BP4: You think that everything’s great and God’s coming, and stuff like that. Or you’re a part of God, or you’re 
making a change in the world. So you don’t care about yourself…
14 Interviewer: So when you think about the future now, how does the future seem to you?
BP9: It’s great, it’s golden, it’s wonderful. It’s going to be full of all the things that I could potentially have, create 
for myself. … I know that my life will be full of abundance [clicks fingers] if I keep this synchronistic 
approach.
15 Interviewer: Do you have worries about the future, or do you feel that the future’s…?
BP5: No. I don’t fear about the future, the future will take care of itself.
16 Interviewer: What can you see if you look into the future?
BP6: Palm trees, whitewashed buildings, hot sun. Anywhere, like that. But not just that, you know. Places where 
I haven’t been.
17 Interviewer: And what does it seem filled with, your future?
BP7: It seems filled with kind of ambition, and drive, and…. I don’t really know how to describe it really. Like, 
hope and er…positivity, creativity, enervation [sic!]. I could just list off….
Interviewer: Does the future seem good to you?
BP7: It does seem good to me. It seems great to me. It seems great, and I can’t wait for it.
18 BP9: I can’t even imagine one [future manic episode]. … I’m through it. I’ve not peaked and gone down. I’m in a 
different arena. This is a new game now.
19 Interviewer: So what you’re saying is that all the issues about mania, and managing mania, in the past are…
BP4: Fizzling out.
Owen/Martin/GergelPsychopathology 2018;51:371–379376
DOI: 10.1159/000495006
where, death is overwhelmingly present, a future which 
shapes present experience.
The ability to project oneself into the future is essential 
to self-determination, which presupposes an ability to ex-
perience one’s present task of deliberation and choice as 
shaping one’s future. Nevertheless, decisions about one’s 
own treatment require the ability not simply to project 
oneself into a future, but to experience this future as 
“evaluatively differentiated,” insofar as it has a potential 
variety of different values and meanings. A future experi-
enced with only one possible meaning or value becomes 
rigidly closed to the possibility of being shaped. Self- 
determination is, accordingly, threatened.
As we have said, our data show projection into a fu- 
ture – but a future keenly sensed as dark with anticipa-
tory anxiety. Excerpt 4 illustrates this: the participant in-
dicates that the act of attending to the future is at the heart 
of the experience of depressive terror.
In all severe depression interviews, the ability to expe-
rience one’s future, in relation to treatment, as open and 
amenable to shaping was absent, or severely threatened. 
In excerpt 5 we see how anticipated death or nothingness 
prevents any possible future evaluative differentiation 
and how decision-making is clearly affected by how an 
anticipated future shapes the experience of the present. 
A further pattern of impaired decision-making ability 
also emerged in how interviewees failed to assimilate past 
experiences into making inferences/judgements about 
their future. The pattern is shown in excerpt 6. Here, a 
clear acknowledgement of past variability and recovery 
is accompanied by a simultaneous belief that the future 
lacks this potential. There is no movement from the 
premiss of past regularities (my mood has shown change) 
to its inductive conclusion (changes in mood will likely 
continue and recovery is possible). What is striking here 
is how the future is experienced as radically different 
from the past. For someone in the throes of such an ex-
perience, ordinary inductive reasoning no longer gets 
much traction. This impaired reasoning can be under-
stood as a consequence of how the future is being expe-
rienced – through the category or lens of death and nega-
tion.
By contrast, in non-severe depression the experience 
of the future as evaluatively differentiated in relation to 
treatment was evident in all our cases. Excerpt 7 gives an 
example. Evaluative differentiation was occurring in the 
non-severe cases even though symptom loads were high 
and the future was typically experienced as bleak and 
painful (excerpt 8). With N5, for example, there was a 
seemingly agonising anticipated future (excerpt 9). Nev-
ertheless, this was counterbalanced by the future possibil-
ity of alleviation through treatment (excerpt 10).
Mania
Current classifications place mania at the opposite 
pole of depression within a single disease entity, bipolar 
affective disorder. The notion of an oppositional and 
symmetrical relation was supported by our data on tem-
poral experience. The mania interviews were rich with 
references to life, possibilities and salvation – the very op-
posites of depressive death, nothingness or hopelessness. 
Excerpts 11–13 give examples of these categories of expe-
rience.
Again, these categories are futural – possibilities relate 
to future potential as opposed to what is now actualised; 
one looks forward to salvation. Indeed, we found plentiful 
evidence of a strong and immediate experience of the fu-
ture, with excerpts 14–17 as illustrations.
As with depression, the future does not admit the pos-
sibility of evaluative differentiation and is fixed inflexib- 
ly – in the case of mania, within positivity. Yet, while this 
experience of the future shapes the experience of the pres-
ent (the present seems “pulled” towards the future), sig-
nificantly, it does not extend to shaping the past, where, 
in particular, past episodes of mania were typically re-
called accurately and without any pervasive positive va-
lence. Here we once again see a distinctive impairment of 
inductive abilities, similar to that which occurred with 
depression, since the dominance of manic futurity ap-
pears to prevent any accurate recollection of past episodes 
from being used to make future predictions. Past episodes 
were, quite literally, experienced as irrelevant to future 
mood management – as excerpts 18 and 19 illustrate.
Experience of the Future in Severe Depression  
and Mania
As experienced in mania and severe depression, the 
future and its dominance over the present appear fixed at 
polar ends of the value spectrum. Within mania, the fu-
ture is bright, the present without sickness (excerpts 11 
and 14); within depression, the converse seems true (ex-
cerpts 1 and 3). This undermines the ability to draw eval-
uative distinctions between future possibilities (excerpts 
5, 14 and 15). Yet, deciding for oneself about mental 
health treatment requires, as we have said, an ability to 
project oneself into a future with potentially different value 
outcomes. We shape our futures both by selecting current 
and anticipated positives and by navigating negatives. 
Without future negatives experienceable (as in mania) or 
without future positives experienceable (as in severe de-
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pression), the future becomes closed to the possibility of 
the individual shaping it and thereby closed to self-deter-
mination. Moreover, within this future, previous regu-
larities of mood variation become irrelevant to reasoning 
about mood management (excerpts 6, 18 and 19), and the 
process of using relevant information from the past (in-
ductive reasoning) appears to break down. Notice that 
this failure need not reflect any general impairment of 
reasoning abilities; indeed, relative to the distorted tem-
poral experience, the reasoning itself may well be valid.
Discussion
Based on our phenomenological interviews, we have 
proposed a temporal understanding of decision-making 
ability in affective disorder. In both severe depression and 
mania, the future can be experienced in a radically anom-
alous way which can undermine DMC for treatment.
Limitations
We did not have interview data on hypomania, bipolar 
depression or mixed states, which limits our analysis 
across the full range of affective disorders. Further data 
on these additional states would be desirable. Whilst we 
had a comparison group with non-severe depression in 
which temporal abilities were evidenced, the study did 
not include a healthy control group.
From a more ethical-legal angle, questions remain re-
lated to the decision-specific nature of DMC in affective 
disorder. We found some evidence that in severe depres-
sion and mania, some day-to-day decision-making, such as 
planning to take a shower (severe depression) or remem-
bering to pay for a TV licence (mania), could be uninflu-
enced in their temporal operation despite a temporal inabil-
ity concerning treatment. This suggests potential support 
for decision specificity and the need to ensure that impair-
ments of temporal abilities are related to the specific deci-
sion under consideration, without any global assumptions 
about the decision-making ability. Further analysis would 
be needed to consider non-mundane decisions such as re-
search participation or financial management.
Finally, although the temporal understanding focuses 
on the decision-making process rather than outcome, the 
extent to which it escapes value judgements can be ques-
tioned. For example, a strong religious belief about salva-
tion or despair comes with a predestined exclusive posi-
tivity or negativity (in this sense an evaluative inflexibil-
ity). If we accept that such a belief is consistent with 
exercising self-determination, might it be argued that our 
temporal understanding is then based on a value judge-
ment which discriminates against those with affective dis-
order? Yet, law and psychiatry do create exclusion criteria 
for culturally sanctioned religious beliefs, and there may 
well be sound phenomenological evidence for why these 
cases are distinct. Comparative interview data involving 
people with such religious beliefs, without affective disor-
der, could be helpful to address this question.
Experience of the Future in Affective Disorder
Both severe depression and mania lead to experienced 
futures fixed at polar ends of the value spectrum without 
differentiation – in mania, a positive valence structured 
around limitless possibility and creation, and in severe de-
pression, a negative valence structured around negation 
and death. As argued, an ability for evaluative differentia-
tion in relation to future options is a necessary condition 
for self-determination, and through this lens, we can see a 
common structure to DMC for treatment in severe affec-
tive disorder across very different mental states (depres-
sion and mania). This also helps us to solve some puzzles 
that have existed regarding affective disorder in relation to 
the clinical concept of insight. There is evidence suggesting 
that insight is a good proxy for DMC for treatment in ma-
nia, whereas in severe depression it is a poor proxy [27]. 
The temporal understanding helps us to see why. With a 
future experienced as having inherent positive valence, an 
awareness of illness and relabelling of symptoms as patho-
logical (core dimensions of the insight construct) become 
impossible self-conceptions, whereas with a future experi-
enced as having inherently negative valence, the core di-
mensions of insight become salient self-conceptions.
Moreover, in both affective states, the process of in-
ductive reasoning can break down in a similar way, with 
the inflexibly positive or negative future rendering any 
past transitions in health irrelevant to current treatment 
decisions. Within severe depression, the negativity of 
one’s future rules out the consideration of possible recov-
ery. Conversely, within mania, a future destined to be 
positive makes past experiences of illness irrelevant to 
future health.
In both mania and severe depression, this constricted 
experience of the future occurs phasically within the nat-
ural history of the illness. Given the fluctuating nature of 
capacity loss in severe affective disorder, it is also impor-
tant to point out the time-dependent nature of the sug-
gested temporal inabilities. This phenomenon of chang-
ing temporal abilities is supported by studies showing 
that severe affective disorders are associated with regain-
ing DMC for treatment over time [28]. When the tempo-
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ral structure in severe depression or mania is present, it 
limits how the patient’s past experience of illness can be 
used as a relevant guide to treatment. This is because the 
concept of treatment itself revolves around the notion of 
future health, which will, during episodes of severe de-
pression or mania, be experienced radically differently 
than at other times. For severely depressed patients – such 
as D4 and D5 (see excerpts 3 and 6), experiencing a future 
of negation and death – why would treatment not be futile 
and possibly even cruel? For manic patients – such as BP7 
(see excerpts 11 and 17), anticipating an entirely bright 
future of boundless possibility – what potential benefit 
could treatment have?
Both impairments of the decision-making process 
(loss of evaluative differentiation and breaks in inductive 
reasoning) are likely to impact on the ability to appreci-
ate, or use and weigh, information about reasonably fore-
seeable consequences of treatment. We therefore suggest 
that those assessing DMC in cases of affective disorder 
should determine whether these distinctive forms of eval-
uative inflexibility and inductive failure are occurring.
As we discussed at the outset of this article, the debate 
surrounding assessment of DMC in affective disorder 
faces something of an impasse in relation to the problems 
of “cognitive bias” and “outcome bias.” Early discussions 
about how to manage the cognitive bias of ability tests of 
DMC for treatment have made limited progress. For ex-
ample, the view that we need to consider whether a deci-
sion is “seriously irrational,” proposed by Culver and 
Gert [6], or whether it involves recognisable or patho-
logical values, proposed by Charland [2], both tend to-
ward an outcome test of DMC – i.e., whether you have 
DMC will depend on whether a treating clinician (or 
judge) thinks your decision is irrational or valuable. Yet, 
within pluralistic, democratic societies, there is scepti-
cism surrounding such outcome tests, and many jurisdic-
tions instead value an analysis of the decision-making 
process itself. Bursztajn et al. [29] focused on risks and 
benefits, suggesting that with affective disorders, individ-
uals may minimise or deny benefits of treatment and 
overemphasise risks. Yet, the question still remains as to 
how the values assigned to risks and benefits of treatment 
are interfered with by affective disorder.
The “appreciation” measures, designed to assess the 
non-cognitive elements of DMC, are, as we have dis-
cussed, still subject to difficulties. The criterion of “ratio-
nal belief” puts delusion at the centre, but in affective dis-
order delusion is not always present or the relevant clini-
cal feature and – in some jurisdictions at least – there is 
unsettled opinion on whether “rational belief” is a legiti-
mate legal standard. Without a more detailed and tailored 
understanding of how DMC is affected by mood disor-
ders, it is difficult to avoid the problems of arbitrariness 
in assessment of decision-making ability or a reliance on 
“outcome-based” assessments.
We suggest that our temporal understanding of deci-
sion-making abilities in affective disorder might be one 
way of helping to break through the impasse regarding 
“cognitive bias” and “outcome bias.” In applying this un-
derstanding, the assessor is not focused on whether par-
ticular values and beliefs are driving the decision-making 
process or whether the decisional outcome itself is ratio-
nal or valuable. Rather, the assessor focuses on whether a 
distinctive temporal phenomenology is occurring or not. 
If it is occurring, serious distortions of the risk/benefit ap-
praisal of treatment will result which may constitute an 
inability to “use or weigh,” or “appreciate,” treatment in-
formation.
We found that in our data it was not difficult to find 
evidence of the temporal abilities (in the non-severe de-
pression cases) and that evidence for the temporal inabil-
ities in the severe depression or mania cases was often 
surprisingly clear once it was understood what to look for. 
Borderline or marginal temporal abilities did not emerge 
as a major theme in our data. This moderates some of the 
possible concerns that because affective symptoms are a 
matter of degree, temporal abilities will be too and the 
problem of imposing arbitrary cut-off points on border-
line, or marginal, cases will arise. The changes in temporal 
abilities across non-severe to severe depression suggested 
that distinct qualitative shifts are possible.
Clinical Relevance of the Research
Our temporal understanding of decision-making abil-
ity in affective disorder is based on a notion of distortion 
of future experience with loss of evaluative differentiation 
and breaks in inductive reasoning. Given that this under-
standing stems from dynamic clinical processes and pa-
tient experience rather than legal definitions, it is clini-
cally favourable. Furthermore, its focus on the decision-
making process rather than outcome makes it compliant 
with DMC law. We hope, therefore, that this temporal 
understanding can assist in bringing more detailed struc-
ture to assessments of DMC for treatment in affective dis-
order, help to identify relevant tipping points in decision-
making ability/inability, and reduce arbitrary or idiosyn-
cratic values and rationality-based assessments. Future 
work will have to address the translatability of this under-
standing to practical assessment tools and the acceptabil-
ity of it to policymakers and judges.
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